Common everyday materials such as textiles, foodstuffs, soil or skin can have complex, mutable and varied appearances. Under typical viewing conditions, most observers can visually recognize materials effortlessly, and determine many of their properties without touching them. Visual material perception raises many fascinating questions for vision researchers, neuroscientists and philosophers, yet has received little attention compared to the perception of color or shape. Here we discuss some of the challenges that material perception raises and argue that further philosophical thought should (...) be directed to how we see materials. (shrink)

Everyone agrees that testing hypotheses is important, but Bowers et al. provide scant details about where hypotheses about perception and brain function should come from. We suggest that the answer lies in considering how information about the outside world could be acquired – that is, learned – over the course of evolution and development. Deep neural networks (DNNs) provide one tool to address this question.

Racial Battle Fatigue is described as the physical and psychological toll taken due to constant and unceasing discrimination, microagressions, and stereotype threat. This edited volume looks at RBF from the perspectives of graduate students, middle level academics, and chief diversity officers at major institutions of learning.

This volume provides a concentrated and powerful dialog about the nexus between schools, prisons, and the free-market economy where youth are on fast tracks from schools to prisons.

This book critically examines nine pre-service teacher candidates, and the author’s experience, to explore the ways in which white educators manifest understandings of white racial identity and professional choice through oral narratives. Ultimately the text proposes a new, non-developmental model for thinking about white racial identity.

This book critically examines nine pre-service teacher candidates, and the author’s experience, to explore the ways in which white educators manifest understandings of white racial identity and professional choice through oral narratives. Ultimately the text proposes a new, non-developmental model for thinking about white racial identity.

We prove the following result which is due to the third author. Let [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] determinacy and [Formula: see text] determinacy both hold true and there is no [Formula: see text]-definable [Formula: see text]-sequence of pairwise distinct reals, then [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable. The proof yields that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies that [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable for all reals [Formula: see text]. A consequence is (...) the Determinacy Transfer Theorem for arbitrary [Formula: see text], namely the statement that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies [Formula: see text] determinacy. (shrink)

We prove the following result which is due to the third author. Let [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] determinacy and [Formula: see text] determinacy both hold true and there is no [Formula: see text]-definable [Formula: see text]-sequence of pairwise distinct reals, then [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable. The proof yields that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies that [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable for all reals [Formula: see text]. A consequence is (...) the Determinacy Transfer Theorem for arbitrary [Formula: see text], namely the statement that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies [Formula: see text] determinacy. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...) account, on the other hand, appears to be unable to similarly explain the reliability of mathematical practice without violating one of its central tenets. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.

Vigorous debate over the moral propriety of cognitive enhancement exists, but the views of the public have been largely absent from the discussion. To address this gap in our knowledge, four experiments were carried out with contrastive vignettes in order to obtain quantitative data on public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement. The data collected suggest that the public is sensitive to and capable of understanding the four cardinal concerns identified by neuroethicists, and tend to cautiously accept cognitive enhancement even as they (...) recognize its potential perils. The public is biopolitically moderate, endorses both meritocratic principles and the intrinsic value of hard work, and appears to be sensitive to the salient moral issues raised in the debate. Taken together, these data suggest that public attitudes toward enhancement are sufficiently sophisticated to merit inclusion in policy deliberations, especially if we seek to align public sentiment and policy. (shrink)

C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in (...) particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely. (shrink)

Attempts to understand the fundamental forces shaping conflict between attacking and defending groups can be hampered by a narrow focus on humans and reductionist, oversimplified modelling. Further progress depends on recognising the striking parallels in between-group conflict across the animal kingdom, harnessing the power of experimental tests in nonhuman species and modelling the eco-evolutionary feedbacks that drive attack and defence.

We show that under $\mathsf {BMM}$ and “there exists a Woodin cardinal, $"$ the nonstationary ideal on $\omega _1$ cannot be defined by a $\Pi _1$ formula with parameter $A \subset \omega _1$. We show that the same conclusion holds under the assumption of Woodin’s $(\ast )$ -axiom. We further show that there are universes where $\mathsf {BPFA}$ holds and $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is $\Pi _1(\{\omega _1\})$ -definable. Lastly we show that if the canonical inner model with one Woodin cardinal (...) $M_1$ exists, there is a generic extension of $M_1$ in which $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is saturated and $\Pi _1(\{ \omega _1\} )$ -definable, and $\mathsf {MA_{\omega _1}}$ holds. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a conception of explanatory unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to wit, that in our drive to unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world and consequently produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to choose between rival patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice having (...) already been made. I also suggest a way of answering the worry that Kitcher is not likely to endorse. (shrink)

This paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics, codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on Kitcher's own conception of naturalism. Kitcher's conception of naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of belief-regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth. Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of these commitments.

Family firm leaders acting as stewards of a close-knit enterprise may attempt to build a positive atmosphere of trust, clarity, and cohesiveness in the firm’s operation. Yet, conditions unique to family firms may lead some family members to develop a heightened sense of entitlement and weaker bonds to the organization. This creates conditions for a Fredo effect, where a family member’s incompetence, opportunistic behaviors, and/or ethically dubious actions can impede the firm’s success, potentially resulting in a scandal that could lead (...) to the firm’s demise and negative economic impact on employees, customers, and other stakeholders. Surveying 147 family-firm members, we examine the role that linkages among perceptions of family harmony norms, distributive fairness, role ambiguity, and relationship conflict play in the emergence of a family member who acts as an impediment to the firm, which can be manifested in damaging unethical behaviors. As hypothesized, family harmony norms and fairness perceptions are negatively related to family impediment, while role ambiguity is positively related to family impediment. However, relationship conflict mediates these connections, underscoring the potential damage this type of conflict can create in a family firm, even if leaders of the firm attempt to establish conditions that reflect a stewardship approach to firm governance. We discuss how these findings impact the development of an ethical climate in the family firm and the implications for family business survival or scandal. (shrink)

Duncan Pritchard has argued that his basis-relative anti-luck construal of a safety condition on knowing avoids the problem with necessary truths that safety conditions are often thought to have, viz., that beliefs the contents of which are necessarily true are trivially safe. He has further argued that adding an ability condition to truth, belief, and his anti-luck safety conditions yields an adequate account of knowledge. In this paper, we argue that not only does Pritchard’s anti-luck safety condition have a problem (...) with necessary truths, adding an ability condition is of no help. Indeed, the same sort of case that precipitates Pritchard’s introduction of an ability condition shows the inadequacy of his completed anti-luck account of knowledge. Moreover, reconstruing safety as an anti-risk condition as Pritchard has recently done does not fix the problem we’ve identified. We conclude by entertaining a radical suggestion to the effect that the failures of safety-based accounts of modal knowledge are due to failures of doxastic success rather than failures to satisfy an anti-luck (or anti-risk) condition. Accepting this radical suggestion makes available the view that there is, after all, no special problem between safety and necessary truths. (shrink)

Six articles discuss the benefits and disadvantages of postmodern philosophy as a foundation for social work and human service practice. Simultaneously co-published as Social Thought, v.18, no.3 1998. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.

Standard accounts of semantics for counterfactuals confront the true–true problem: when the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual are both actually true, the counterfactual is automatically true. This problem presents a challenge to safety-based accounts of knowledge. In this paper, drawing on work by Angelika Kratzer, Alan Penczek, and Duncan Pritchard, we propose a revised understanding of semantics for counterfactuals utilizing machinery from generalized quantifier theory which enables safety theorists to meet the challenge of the true–true problem.

Philip Kitcher has argued against the apriority of mathematical knowledge in a number of places. His arguments rely on a conception of mathematical knowledge as embedded in a historical tradition and the claim that this sort of embedding compromises apriority. In this paper, I argue that tradition dependence of mathematical knowledge does not compromise its apriority. I further identify the factors which appear to lead Kitcher to argue as he does.

In this chapter, I consider some problems with naturalizing mathematics. More specifically, I consider how the two leading kinds of approach to naturalizing mathematics, to wit, Quinean indispensability‐based approaches and Maddy's Second Philosophical approach, seem to run afoul of constraints that any satisfactory naturalistic mathematics must meet. I then suggest that the failure of these kinds of approach to meet the relevant constraints indicates a general problem with naturalistic mathematics meeting these constraints, and thus with the project of naturalizing mathematics (...) itself. (shrink)

Standard accounts of semantics for counterfactuals confront the true–true problem: when the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual are both actually true, the counterfactual is automatically true. This problem presents a challenge to safety‐based accounts of knowledge. In this paper, drawing on work by Angelika Kratzer, Alan Penczek, and Duncan Pritchard, we propose a revised understanding of semantics for counterfactuals utilizing machinery from generalized quantifier theory which enables safety theorists to meet the challenge of the true–true problem.

According to an influential contextualist solution to skepticism advanced by Keith DeRose, denials of skeptical hypotheses are, in most contexts, strong yet insensitive. The strength of such denials allows for knowledge of them, thus undermining skepticism, while the insensitivity of such denials explains our intuition that we do not know them. In this paper we argue that, under some well-motivated conditions, a negated skeptical hypothesis is strong only if it is sensitive. We also consider how a natural response on behalf (...) of DeRose appears to be equally available to his primary rival (viz., the sensitivity theorist). (shrink)